In family firms, the succession of controlling equity stake to next generation is an issue of paramount importance. This, however, can be a major challenge in the presence of heavy inheritance or gift tax burden (high tax rate and absence of tax-saving vehicles, such as trusts or foundations) and in the absence of dual-class equity. Such regulatory environment may lead families to seek alternative ways of succession.
Introduction
In family firms, the succession of controlling equity stake to next generation is an issue of paramount importance. A successful succession allows the family to perverse its control for another generation. Depending upon who succeeds the equity stake, it will also greatly influence the decision on who will be the next CEO. One can say that 'managerial' succession is of secondary importance compared to 'ownership' succession.
In the existing finance literature, there is a growing body of research on family firm performance (McConaughy et al., 1998; Anderson and Reeb, 2003; Maury, 2006; Villalonga and Amit, 2006; Miller et al., 2007; Andres, 2008) , the management succession of family firms (Smith and Amoako-Adu, 1999; Bennedson et al., 2007; Cucculelli and Micucci, 2008) and the control-enhancing mechanisms family firms use (La Porta, López de Silanes, and Shleifer, 1999; Claessens, Djankov, and Lang, 2000; Nenova, 2001; Faccio and Lang, 2000; Villalonga and Amit, 2009; Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick, 2010) . But surprisingly, no paper exists on the succession of family ownership. This paper aims to make a small step in filling this gap .
Handing over controlling equity stake from one generation to another generally faces two challenges. One is the risk of dilution and the other is the risk of taxation. If a family firm repeatedly relies on external equity financing, the equity stake later generations inherit may not be large enough to warrant control over the firm. In certain jurisdictions, this challenge is resolved with the use of dual-class equity or voting agreements (Villalonga and Amit, 2009 ).
Descendants that hold shares with multiple voting rights or that entered contract with shareholders ceding their voting power can be free from the risk of dilution.
The risk of taxation is another major challenge. Although some jurisdictions have abolished inheritance tax, many still retain it.
1 In the U.S. the tax rate is as high as 35%. Also, even if abolished, capital gains tax may still apply upon the transfer of wealth. Gift tax also has been abolished in recent years, and even if it exists, many deductions and exemptions apply.
Nevertheless, there are nontrivial number of jurisdictions that still retain it. In certain jurisdictions, this challenge of taxation is resolved with the use of trusts or private foundations 1 Some jurisdictions use the term estate tax instead of inheritance tax.
-3 -that receive shares as donation (Villalonga and Amit, 2009) . As charitable entities, they are exempt from taxation, but still governed by family members who serve as trustees or board of directors.
What if dual-class equity is prohibited by law, voting agreement counterparties are hard to find, and trusts or private foundations are heavily regulated? Founding family would have a strong incentive to seek alternative ways of handing over controlling equity stake to their descendants. One alternative is forming a business group and letting the heir own a controlling equity stake in a firm or multiple firms that control others. The business group can have a pyramidal structure, but this is not necessary. Cross-or circular-shareholdings can also serve the same purpose. But, there is a critical problem with this scheme. The heir may not have enough wealth in the beginning to acquire controlling equity stake in the firm that controls others.
There are two possible solutions to this. One is making the holding company or the de facto holding company (in case the group does not have a pyramidal structure) issue new shares privately to the heir at a heavily discounted price, so that the heir can acquire controlling equity stake in the holding company with low financial burden. 2 This, however, is not possible for publicly-traded companies, where preemptive rights of existing shareholders are typically well protected. Even for privately-traded ones, tax implications will prevent the use of such scheme.
An alternative solution is tunneling corporate wealth from one firm to another through related-party transactions. That is, setting up a privately-traded firm, where the heir is a major shareholder, and instructing other firms to purchase goods and services from that firm. Increased sales and earnings of this firm will increase its asset size. Eventually, the firm can grow large enough to acquire controlling equity stakes in other firms within the group. The firm may also pay out dividends so that the heir can directly acquire shares in other firms. Thus, family ownership can be in the hands of the heir without paying any gift or inheritance tax to the government.
This possibility implies that any serious research on the succession of family ownership must also consider changes in intra-group ownership structure and related-party transactions among 2 Same purpose can be served with a convertible bond or a bond with warrant with heavily discounted conversion ratio or exercise price.
-4 -member firms. In this paper, we attempt to do this by studying a country -Korea -that perfectly matches the setting we initially considered. That is, a country where dual-class equity is prohibited by law, voting agreement counterparties are hard to find, and trusts or private foundations are heavily regulated.
Anecdotal evidence of family ownership succession through tunneling abounds among
Korean chaebols -family-controlled business groups in Korea. An exemplary case is Hanwha S&C, an integrated IT service firm of Hanwha group (also see Figure 1 ). Originally, it was wholly owned by Kim Seung-youn (33.3%), the group chairman of Hanwha group, and Hanwha Corp. for selling Hanwha S&C shares below the DCF value. In this civil charge, the shareholders asked for a compensation of 45 billion Korean won (approximately, 45 million US dollars). In October 2013, Seoul Central District Court ordered the directors to pay back to the company 8.9 billion Korean won, which is well below the originally estimated damage. At the time of this writing, the case is at the appellate court. In a separate criminal case (embezzlement), Chairman Kim was sentenced a three-year prison with a five-year suspension (finalized in February 2014). But, he was acquitted from the charge of selling Hanwha S&C shares below the DCF value. These results indicate how difficult it is to prevent tunneling with ex post legal remedies.
-5 -treatment. Second, earnings increase with related-party transactions in treatment group firms after the treatment. Third, dividend payout increase with related-party transactions in treatment group firms after the treatment. Fourth, importance in group control increases with related-party transactions in treatment group firms after the treatment. We measure the importance in group control by marginal contribution to group control used in Kim, Lim, and Sung (2007) . Further analyses reveal that our results are driven by related-party sales to member firms rather than related-party purchases from them.
We also conduct a number of falsification tests. First, we run similar difference-in-differences regressions using treatment group firms where 'non-heirs' become a major shareholder. We do not find any increase in related-party transactions in these firms after the treatment. Second, we run similar difference-in-differences regressions where counterparties of the original treatment group firms (e.g., firms where heir become a major shareholder) are used as our new treatment group. Again, we do not find any increase in earnings, dividend payouts, or control over other firms in these new treatment group firms after the treatment.
Our paper contributes to the existing literature in three ways. First, to the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper on 'family ownership' succession, which we believe is an issue of paramount importance in family firms, but its research virtually missing in the existing finance literature. As mentioned earlier, the main focus of existing literature is on 'managerial' succession.
Second, we contribute to family firm performance studies, which became popular since Anderson and Reeb (2003) . We contribute to this area of study by highlighting the importance of related-party transactions when assessing performance, especially when family firms are parts of a business group. More remotely, our study is also related to the studies on managerial ownership and firm performance (Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1988) . Again, in a business group setting, the relationship between ownership and performance cannot be assessed without considering relatedparty transactions.
Third, we add to the literature on business group tunneling (Bae, Kang, and Kim, 2002; Bertrand, Mehta, and Mullainathan, 2002; Cheung, Rau, and Stouraitis, 2006; Baek, Kang, and Lee, 2006) . We report empirical evidence that related-party transactions between member firms can be used as a tunneling vehicle benefiting founding family members at the expense of outside -6 -minority shareholders. Our evidence on tunneling, however, is indirect in nature like in any other tunneling papers.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 and 3 explain our research design, data, and key variables. Section 4 reports our empirical results, and Section 5 concludes.
Research Design
In this paper, our aim is to quantify the effect of ownership change on firm's related-party transactions, earnings, dividend payouts, and its control over other firms. An obvious challenge to this is the endogeneity of ownership change. To address this, difference-in-differences (DiD) or instrumental variable (IV) approach making use of an exogenous shock to ownership change is in order. But, unfortunately, we do not have such a shock in our sample -Korean chaebol firms during 2000-2009.
So, we take a second-best approach of using covariate-matched control group firms. First, we identify firm-years that experienced a major increase in heir's ownership. We label this set of firms as the treatment group. Second, for each treatment group firm, we identify its match among firms that did not experience any major change in family ownership during our sample period and that is from another chaebol group. 4 We use three matching covariates: year, industry, and firm's asset size. Given the dominance of manufacturing firms in Korea, we use 4-digit Korea SIC code for manufacturing and 2-digit for others. We label this set of firms as the control group, and expect that the use of matching firms will significantly lower the risk of self-selection bias. Third, by conducting difference-in-differences test, we compare these two groups of firms before and after the treatment.
More specifically, we run the following regression to verify whether treatment group firms experience greater increase in related-party transactions than control group firms after the treatment. 4 Major family ownership changes include changes in heir's net ownership by more than 5%p, changes in controlling shareholder's net ownership by more than 5%p, and changes in other relatives' net ownership by more than 5%p. We conduct two falsification tests in this paper. First, we run difference-in-differences regression (1) using treatment group firms where 'non-heirs' become a major shareholder. In this Second, we run difference-in-differences regressions (2) - (4), where counterparties of the original treatment group firms (e.g. firms where heir becomes a major shareholder) are used as our new treatment group. Again, if the increase in related-party transactions are for the benefit of heirs and their successions, one should not see firms in the other side of transaction producing -9 -higher earnings, paying out more dividends, or strengthening control over other firms.
Data and Key Variables

A. Sample Chaebol Groups
Our treatment and control group firms are from 26 chaebol groups that have been designated as 
B. Major Increase in Heir's Ownership
Since 2007, KFTC made public the detailed ownership structure of large business groups it designates. This is done through a portal site, named OPNI, from which we download all the necessary data for this paper. The data is available from 2000. When it comes to share ownership -10 -among member firms, this data gives a complete picture. Complicated web of intragroup ownership structure is summarized in a simple n n × matrix, where n is the number of member firms. In this matrix, element ij x is the fraction of shares firm j owns in firm i .
But, when it comes to share ownership by controlling person's family members, the data is incomplete in a sense that it does not give information for each individual family member. For privacy reasons, family owned shares are broken down into three groups: shares held by the controlling shareholder (the person in control of the group), the immediate family members, and the other relatives. Immediate family members include the spouse, the parents, and the children.
Other relatives include those within certain degrees of kinship (six with the controlling shareholder or four with the spouse).
In this paper, we regard the shares held by immediate family members as those held by the heir. There can be two potential problems for doing so. One is that it includes the shares held by spouse and parents. Another has to do with the possibility of younger siblings, instead of children, succeeding family ownership. The first problem is trivial since spouse and parents hardly own shares. 5 Among the treatment group firms we study in this paper, there is only one firm with spouse's ownership and none with parents'. In our robustness check, we obtain virtually the same result after excluding this firm from the sample. member firm. In this paper, however, we do not make use of this data. At the time of this writing, this data covers only four years, which is too short to investigate the key hypotheses of this paper.
-11 -means that its 'net' ownership (heir's ownership -controlling shareholder's ownership -other relatives' ownership) increases by more than 5%p and that its ownership is greater than those of controlling shareholder's and other relatives'. That is,
is change in heir's net ownership, and
R OWN _ are respectively the ownership held by the heir, the controlling shareholder, and other relatives.
Two points are worth noting here. First, we focus on ownership relative to other family members (e.g. net ownership). If ownership increases not only for the heir, but also for others, the subsequent increase in related-party transactions cannot be regarded as those just for the heir.
Likewise, the subsequent increase in firm's importance in group control cannot be regarded as that for the heir's succession. By focusing on net ownership, we can effectively rule out such alternative explanations. But, we do not exclude the possibility where the ownership of heir and others both drop, but the drop of others is greater.
7 Second, we impose a condition that the heir is the largest shareholder among the family members. So, we exclude cases where heir's net ownership increases by more than 5%p, but its ownership is yet below that of other family groups.
Other treatment group dummies used in our falsification tests are similarly defined.
C. Marginal Contribution to Group Control it
MCI is the marginal contribution to group control index of firm i at year t . This index, originally from Kim, Lim, and Sung (2007), is a measure devised to identify firms, through which a controlling shareholder can most efficiently strengthen his control over other firms in the same group. To be an efficient control vehicle, this firm must hold equity stakes in other firms, which in turn hold equity stakes in others, which in turn hold equity stakes in others, and so on. One way to quantify the degree of such direct and indirect equity holdings is to compute the cash flow rights a controlling shareholder can additionally obtain from other firms when the vehicle firm becomes a part of the group. Alternatively, one can compute the cash flow rights a controlling shareholder will have to lose from others when the vehicle firm is no longer a group firm. By 7 Three such cases exist in our sample. If we drop them, statistical significance weakens, but our basic results remain intact.
-12 -scaling this additional cash flow rights by the vehicle firm's book equity, one can have a measure that captures marginal contribution to group control. That is, the additional dollar amount of equity one can obtain in other firms by investing one dollar of equity in the vehicle firm. Notice that this measure does not identify firms that currently has the largest equity stakes in other firms.
Rather, it identifies firms that will become one in the future. The controlling shareholder that wishes to maximize his control for a given amount of equity investment, has the incentive to enlarge the firm with the highest MCI and let it grow into a firm that has the largest equity stakes in other firms. Equation (4) shows the formula of firm i 's marginal contribution to group control index:
it BE is firm i 's book value of equity at year t . They identify firms by computing the average decrease in critical control threshold (CC) across all group firms other than firm i, after excluding firm i from the group. Critical control (CC) threshold is the highest control threshold that is consistent with family control of a firm. Control threshold T is the minimum votes a family needs to hold directly or indirectly to control a firm. This measure has an advantage of using voting rights, which we wish to capture, instead of cash flow rights. But, this measure is not adjusted for firm size, and therefore has a tendency of favoring large firms that already has large control over others.
-13 -The index can have a value equal to zero. This happens when firm i does not have any equity investment in other member firms. It should also be noted that the index has no upper bound. If there is no restriction on debt or the length equity investment chain, the index can be well above '1.' So, we winsorize the index at its 99 th percentile value.
Cash flow rights ( jt cfr ) is the sum of controlling family's direct and indirect ownership.
Again, we follow Kim, Lim, and Sung (2007) and compute cash flow rights as follows:
is controlling family's direct ownership in firm j at year t . Family includes the controlling shareholder, its spouse, and relatives within certain degrees of kinship (six with the controlling shareholder or four with the spouse). The subsequent terms are indirect ownership through member firms under the control of the same controlling shareholder. For example, the second term is family's indirect ownership in firm j through firm k ( k can take values from 1 to n ). The third term is family's indirect ownership in firm j through firm k and firm l ( l can also take values from 1 to n ). Since we know the intragroup ownership structure in a matrix form ( S ), a vector of cash flow rights ( cfr ) can be easily computed by the following formula, where d is the vector of direct family ownership.
RPT is the natural logarithm of 1 plus the sum of firm i 's related-party sales to member firms at year t plus firm i 's related-party purchases from member firms at year t . Sales and purchases are measured in million Korean won (approximately thousand US dollars) and adjusted for inflation using Bank of Korea's GDP deflator (base year = 2005).
it RPS is the natural logarithm of 1 plus the firm i 's related-party sales to member firms at year t .
it RPP is the natural logarithm of 1 plus the firm i 's related-party purchases from member firms at year t .
EBITDA is the signed natural logarithm of earnings before interest, tax, depreciation, and amortization of firm i at year t . A signed logarithm takes the logarithm of the absolute value of the variable and assigns the original sign. Values for absolute value less than one are set to be zero.
Since we have many privately-traded firms in our sample, we use EBITDA instead of Tobin's q as our measure of firm performance. As is the case with related-party transactions, EBITDA is also in million Korean won and adjusted for inflation using Bank of Korea's GDP deflator (base year = 2005).
it DIV is the natural logarithm of 1 plus the cash dividend (including dividends paid out to preferred shareholders) paid out to firm i at year t . Dividends are measured in million Korean won and adjusted for inflation using Bank of Korea's GDP deflator (base year = 2005).
Notice that we deliberately do not scale related-party transactions (RPT) or earnings by sales.
The focus of this paper is not on the fraction of RPT over sales nor on profit margins. Rather, we are interested in the increase in earnings volume thanks to increase RPTs. Larger earnings matter because it helps the firm to hold more equity stakes in other firms or payout more dividends to the heir. But, we do control for size in our regressions. We include firm's total assets in natural logarithm as a covariate in our regressions. Total assets are also in million Korean won and adjusted for inflation using Bank of Korea's GDP deflator (base year = 2005).
The data on related-party transactions are available originally from each company's business reports (similar to 10K in US), but can be massively downloaded from KIS-Value, a financial database administered by NICE Credit Information Service Co., Ltd. KIS-Value provides RPT data not only for publicly-traded listed firms, but also for externally-audited private firms.
TS2000, a financial database administered by the Korea Listed Companies Association (KLCA), provides RPT data limited to publicly-traded listed firms, but it gives the breakdown of RPT data for each counterparty firm. it E and all other accounting variables used as controls are from TS2000.
Results
A. A Preliminary Look
-15 - change of <-5%p to >15%p. The jump, however, is much moderate than that for the heir with the exception of related-party purchases. Similar pattern emerges when using 'mean' changes rather than 'median' changes. Fourth, the patterns for other relatives are mixed. When using median changes, there is a tendency of RPT it , RPS it , RPP it , EBITDA it , and DIV it increasing as we move from the net ownership change of <-5%p to >15%p. But, such patter disappears when using mean changes. Fifth, the changes in related-party transactions or earnings do not fall as we move from the net ownership change of <-5%p to <-15%p. This asymmetric response of related-party transactions and earnings is puzzling, but not the main interest of this paper,
B. Ownership Change and Related-Party Transactions
-16 - The coefficients of our interest (the coefficients on TG i x TP it x RPT it ) are positive and statistically significant when using related-party sales (column 2), positive and marginally significant when using related-party transactions (sum of related-party sales and purchases), but not significant when using related-party purchases (column 3). These results indicate that, it is -17 -related-party sales, not related-party purchases, that benefit the treatment group firms after the treatment. Purchasing raw materials and intermediate goods in favorable terms from other member firms can be a source of profit. But, we do not see this effect in our sample. Rather, we see firms benefiting greatly from sales of goods and services to other member firms.
C. Ownership Change, Related-Party Transactions, and Earnings
This is consistent with the accusations made by non-governmental organizations (NGO) and popular press against Korean chaebols. 9 According to the reports they published, heirs benefit from their equity stakes in firms that heavily rely on related-party sales to member firms. These firms are mostly found in IT services, logistics, advertising, and constructions. The coefficients of our interest (the coefficients on TG i x TP it x RPT it ) are positive and marginally significant when using related-party sales (column 2), but not significant when using related-party transactions (column 1) or related-party purchases (column 3). These results indicate that, it is related-party sales, not related-party purchases, that benefit the treatment group firms after the treatment, and allow them to pay out more dividends. Again, this is consistent with the accusations made by non-governmental organizations (NGO) and popular press that heirs benefit from their equity stakes in firms that heavily rely on related-party sales to member firms.
D. Ownership Change, Related-Party Transactions, and Dividend Payouts
E. Ownership Change, Related-Party Transactions, and Group Control
9 Solidarity for Economic Reform (SER) and its sister organization, Economic Reform Research Institute (ERRI), are the two pioneering NGOs in this area. Since 2006, they have been publishing a number of reports on related-party sales aimed to benefit controlling family members.
-18 - The results on marginal contribution to group control are very similar to those on earnings.
The coefficients of our interest (the coefficients on TG i x TP it x RPT it ) are positive and statistically significant when using related-party sales (column 2), positive and marginally significant when using related-party transactions (sum of related-party sales and purchases), but not significant when using related-party purchases (column 3). Again, it is related-party sales, not related-party purchases, that benefit treatment group firms in terms of control over other firms.
This is also consistent with the anecdotal evidence reported by NGOs and popular press. Table 8 reports the results of our first falsification test. We run difference-in-differences regressions identical to those reported in Table 4 , but using treatment group firms where 'nonheirs' become a major shareholder. Columns In our second falsification test, we run difference-in-differences regressions identical to those reported in Tables 5-7 , but using counterparties of the original treatment group firms (e. 
F. Falsification Tests
Conclusion
In this paper, we investigate if families controlling business groups make use of related-party transactions to benefit firms, in which heirs hold significant equity stakes, and thereby let such We believe our findings are relevant not only to Korea, but also to many other countries.
Family controlled business groups are prevalent in emerging markets and even in some developed economies (Khanna and Yafeh, 2007) . Families controlling these business groups may use related-party transactions as means of family ownership succession if the country's regulatory environment does not permit an easy solution to it.
This paper contributes to the literature in three main ways. First, to the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper on 'family ownership' succession, which we believe is an issue of paramount importance for family firms, but its research virtually missing in the existing literature.
As mentioned earlier, the main focus of existing papers is on 'managerial' succession. Second, we contribute to the studies on family firm performance, which became popular during the past several years. We contribute to this area of study by highlighting the importance of related-party -21 -transactions when assessing firm performance, especially when firms are parts of a business group. Third, we add to the literature on tunneling among business group firms. We report empirical evidence that related-party transactions can be used as a tunneling vehicle benefiting founding family members at the expense of outside minority shareholders. Our evidence on tunneling, however, is indirect in nature like in any other tunneling papers. List of chaebol groups, and the number of their member firms in each year. Column (1) lists a total of 26 Chaebols designated by the FTC for at least 6 years during the sample period of 2000-2009 (e.g. designated in the Aprils of 2001 to 2010). Column (2) counts the number of member firms in each group in each year. Column (3) shows the controlling shareholders' names and column (4) the generations from founders (1, 2, and 3 indicates 1 st , 2 nd , and 3 rd generation). ln(absolute value of earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization/GDP deflator) x sign of original EBITDA if its absolute value is greater than 1, and 0 otherwise.
MCI it
Marginal contribution to group control index; winsorized at the 99 th percentile values; see Section 3.C for the details of its definition.
DIV it ln[(dividend/ GDP deflator) + 1]; dividend is measured in million Korean won (approximately thousand US dollars) Right-Hand Side Variables
TG i Treatment group dummy, which takes a value of 1 if the firm i experiences a major increase in heir's ownership and 0 otherwise. Major increase in heir's ownership means that its net ownership (heir's ownership -controlling shareholder's ownership -other relatives' ownership) increases by more than 5%p and it is greater than both, the controlling shareholder's ownership and the other relatives' ownership. Other treatment group dummies used in our falsification tests are similarly defined.
TP it
Treatment period dummy that takes a value of 1 if firm i is treated at year t or before. Notice that this treatment period dummy is defined separately for each treatment group firm i. Firm fixed effects regressions, identical to those reported in Table 4 , but using treatment group dummy (TG i ), where non-heirs (controlling shareholder or other relatives) become a major shareholder. Columns (1) -(3) ( (4) - (6)) use 25 (30) treatment group firms that experienced major increase in controlling shareholder's (other relative's) ownership and 25 (30) control group firms identified by covariate matching based on year, industry (4-digit code for manufacturing and 2-digit code for others), and asset size. t-values are reported in the parenthesis, and are based on standard errors clustered at the firm level. *, **, and *** respectively indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. Significant results (at 10% level or better) are shown in boldface.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) Tables 5, 6 , and 7, but using counterparties of the original treatment group firms (e.g. firms where heir become a major shareholder) as our new treatment group. TG i takes a value of 1 if firm is the counterparty of the original treatment group firm, and 0 otherwise. TP it takes a value of 1 if the original treatment group firm of firm experiences a major increase in heir's net ownership at year t or before. Control variables are suppressed. We use 18 treatment group firms and 18 control group firms identified by covariate matching based on year, industry (4-digit code for manufacturing and 2-digit code for others), and asset size. t-values are reported in the parenthesis, and are based on standard errors clustered at the firm level. *, **, and *** respectively indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. Significant results (at 10% level or better) are shown in boldface.
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